By D. M. Armstrong
During this vital learn D. M. Armstrong bargains a accomplished method of analytical metaphysics that synthesizes but in addition develops his pondering during the last 20 years. Armstrong's research, which recognizes the "logical atomism" of Russell and Wittgenstein, makes proof (or states of affairs, because the writer calls them) the elemental parts of the realm, interpreting homes, kinfolk, numbers, periods, risk and necessity, inclinations, motives and legislation. it's going to entice a large readership in analytical philosophy.
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Extra info for A World of States of Affairs
These desires are usually described as cravings, irrational cravings. It is not at all plausible, however, to suggest that what makes the satisfaction of desires good for people is that their desires are satisfied. If this were plausible, we would feel no puzzlement at cases such as the saucer of mud. In normal cases, we desire something because we think it will be good in some way independently of its satisfying the desire (cf. 6 Being desire-satisfying is not a goodmaking property, so desire accounts, and the large amount of contemporary thought in welfare economics and elsewhere which rests upon them, are mistaken.
Mill's claim, then, is that the intrinsic nature of a higher pleasure is such that it is more valuable for the person who enjoys it than would be the enjoyment of any amount of lower pleasure, however intense it might be. The first horn of the dilemma allows Mill to remain a full hedonist, but at the price of dropping the higher/lower distinction. The argument is that a full hedonist must accept that what makes one experience more valuable than another can only be its pleasantness or pleasurableness (or, on our broad understanding of hedonism, its enjoyableness).
According to the disjunctive view, the welfare value of any activity I engage in can arise from either the experience of that activity or my enjoyment of it or both. But consider our naturalist in Africa. According to the disjunctive view, the welfare value here consists in his experiences. But why must it be the experience of his accomplishment that is valuable for him? Can we not say that adding substantially to the sum of human knowledge itself, independently of its being an experience, is valuable for a person?
A World of States of Affairs by D. M. Armstrong